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ISSUES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Judicial Review of 
Administrative Discretion 
Charles H. Koch, Jr.* 
Administrative law is dominated by the term discretion. Ad-
ministrative agencies make many kinds of decisions involving a 
wide variety of issues; the resolution of a number of these issues 
emerges through the exercise of discretion. The term discretion, 
then, often defines the function of the agency and describes the 
role of the reviewing court. It is therefore essential that courts 
understand administrative discretion both to evaluate the agency's 
performance and to understand the courts' own function.1 
The term's importance and pervasiveness require a precise 
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1. 2 C. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.7, at 106-07 (1985). 
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meaning within administrative law. Although most courts that 
use the term believe it has such a meaning, the reality is that the 
term is used in numerous ways. 2 This reality explains much of the 
confusion surrounding judicial review of administrative discretion. 
Because agreement on a single meaning is unrealistic, the best 
alternative is to identify different uses of the term and the judicial 
review associated with each. 
The term discretion has at least five different uses in adminis-
trative law.3 The authority to make individualizing decisions in 
the application of general rules can be characterized as "individu-
alizing discretion." Freedom to fill in gaps in delegated authority 
in order to execute assigned administrative functions may be 
called "executing discretion." The power to take action to further 
societal goals is "policymaking discretion." If no review is permit-
ted, the agency is exercising "unbridled discretion." Finally, if the 
decision cannot by its very nature be reviewed, the agency is exer-
cising "numinous discretion." Different judicial functions flow 
from these distinctions. 
Administrative systems that employ discretion are designed 
with the agencies, not the courts, having the primary decisionmak-
ing responsibility. As a result, the judicial attitude when review-
ing an exercise of discretion must be one of restraint, often 
extreme restraint. Further, all types of discretion are character-
ized by some sense that the agency needs a degree of freedom to 
make mistakes. Indeed one of their major distinguishing charac-
teristics is the degree of freedom embodied in each form of discre-
tion. Uses of the term discretion can also be differentiated by 
types and amount of expertise, including specialized knowledge 
and experience, necessary for that variety of discretionary deci-
sionmaking. The level of appropriate review often depends on rel-
ative competence to make decisions. While the five uses of the 
term discretion share these common elements, each use calls for 
different intensity and type of review. 
Of the five, only the first three types of discretion - individual-
izing, executing, and policymaking - are reviewable in the tradi-
tional sense. That is, in only these three types of discretion are 
the core discretionary decisions reviewable.4 Even as to these, the 
2. See Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 754, 762 
(1982). Other commentators have recognized that the term discretion has different 
meanings. E.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31-33 (1977); 0. Flss & 
D. RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 106-07 (2d ed. 1984). Recently, Martin Shapiro de-
scribed certain types of administrative action as varieties of discretion. Shapiro, Ad-
ministrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1500 (1983). These 
categories do not appear intended to be used in a system of judicial review. Indeed, 
Shapiro contends that the existing system for judicial review of administrative discre-
tion has failed. Id. at 1534. 
3. This Article identifies five discrete uses of discretion. The categories are not 
airtight, and the discretion at issue in individual cases will overlap. Nevertheless, the 
law will be improved if courts indicate which type of discretion they believe is under 
review. 
4. "Core discretionary decision" refers to the central issue in an administrative 
determination involving the exercise of discretion. 
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extent of review is limited by the applicable standards of review, 
almost invariably arbitrariness or abuse of discretion. These stan-
dards of review, however, seem to have different meaning as they 
apply to each of these three types of discretion. 
The remaining two uses of the term discretion -unbridled and 
numinous - do not permit judicial review of the core discretion-
ary decision. That does not mean, however, that a reviewing court 
has no function with respect to such decisions; rather, it means 
that the judicial function must focus on factors other than the core 
discretionary decision itself. 
L The Three Reviewable Types of Discretion 
The three reviewable types of discretion are generally covered 
by either the arbitrariness standard or the abuse of discretion 
standard. The same word formulas, however, appear to demand 
different judicial attitudes when applied to the three different 
uses of discretion. The differences appear sound. 
The two standards express very similar levels of judicial scru-
tiny.5 Judge Carl McGowan stated in Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. SEC that the tests for arbitrariness and abuse of 
discretion are far from discrete and should be viewed as cumula-
tive.6 Rather than being cumulative, however, the two standards 
overlap. The abuse of discretion standard is often used instead of 
arbitrariness for discretionary decisions that involve nebulous or 
ambiguous supporting judgments. For decisions supported by 
more evaluative-type judgments, the review instruction is more 
likely to refer to the arbitrariness standard. Both standards, how-
ever, instruct the court to tolerate a high risk of error and to ap-
proach the administrative decision with a restrained critical 
attitude. Within this range of attitudes, the court subjects individ-
ualizing discretion, executing discretion, and policymaking discre-
tion to different types of review based on the nature of the 
discretion rather than on the particular word formula used to ex-
press the standard of review. From these distinctions then, some 
precision in the judicial function may emerge. 
A. Individualizing Discretion 
The first, and perhaps the most pervasive, use of discretion in 
administrative law is the power to make individualizing decisions 
5. See Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Sec-
tion Report, 38 AD. L. REV. 239, 292 (1986) (characterizing the proposed ABA recom-
mendations relating to tests for "arbitrariness" as drawing no distinctions among the 
terms "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion" in section 706(2)(A)). 
6. 606 F.2d 1031, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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in administering a program made up of general rules - statutory, 
judicial, or administrative. Discretion, used in this way, refers to 
the discretionary decisionmaker's authority to adjust applicable 
rules at the margin in order to improve a program's ability to do 
individual justice. That is, even where the general rule mandates 
a result, the implementing decisionmaker has some power to mod-
ify that result in a specific application if doing so will better carry 
out the general spirit of the program. 7 
Such discretion incorporates flexibility and a sense of fairness; 
most consider it to be a very positive feature of the administrative 
process.8 At least for the average citizen, the absence of individu-
alizing discretion in an administrative scheme engenders feelings 
of injustice, and those directly affected by such a program are dis-
satisfied with inflexibility. Less evident is the proposition that ad-
ministrative decisionmaking becomes worse if it sticks too closely 
to the rules. Despite these positive aspects of individualizing dis-
cretion, however, in our theory of social conduct we feel more se-
cure if our bureaucrats are constrained by rules. Our attitude 
towards individualizing discretion reflects this conflict.9 
The benefits of individual discretion create a dilemma for ad-
7. A classic example of this form of discretion is an equity court exercising its 
injunction powers. In that context, "[t]he discretion comes in the form of dispensation 
- the court is giving or is being asked to give dispensation from its own rules which 
otherwise dictate the issuance of the injunction." 0. Flss & D. RENDLEMAN, supra 
note 2, at 106. 
8. Professor Kenneth Davis analyzed this type of discretion thoroughly in his 
seminal work, Discretionary Justice. "Discretion is a tool, indispensable for individu-
alization of justice. . . . Rules alone, untempered by discretion, cannot cope with the 
complexities of modern government and of modern justice." K. DAVIS, DISCRETION-
ARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 25 (1969). Davis further stated: "For many 
circumstances the mechanical application of a rule means injustice; what is needed is 
individualized justice, that is, justice which to the appropriate extent is tailored to the 
needs of the individual case. Only through discretion can the goal of individualized 
justice be attained." Id. at 19. Indeed, a major contribution of his book is to urge the 
benefits of a combination of such discretion and rules. Davis recognized that even this 
type of discretion is not without its negative aspects, but nevertheless urged, "Let us 
not oppose discretionary justice that is properly confined, structured, and checked." 
Id. at 26. 
In an almost equally influential work, Judge Henry Friendly discussed due process 
as a mechanism for "mass justice." Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1267 (1975) (Judge Friendly began using the term mass justice on page 1287, but 
he refers to its problems on page 1276.). Judge Friendly pointed out that our mistrust 
of bureaucrats often leads us to limit discretion in mass justice systems. But he, as did 
Davis, generally recognized the benefits of what I have called individualizing discre-
tion, and urged restraint in restricting it. See id. at 1279-80. 
9. An interesting example of a program consciously designed around a grant of 
individualizing discretion is the Civil Aeronautics Board's (CAB) handling of handi-
capped passengers, which gave rise to Paralyzed Veterans of America v. CAB, 752 
F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 244 (1985). The agency conferred limited 
authority on carriers and ultimately on flight personnel with respect to services avail-
able to handicapped passengers. Among other things, petitioners objected to the dis-
cretion granted to air carriers in dealing with canes and carry-on wheelchairs. 752 
F.2d at 702. The court agreed with the agency that the grant of individualizing discre-
tion to the carriers was the best means to balance airlines' safety needs against the 
needs of handicapped passengers. Id. at 703. The court recognized the value of indi-
vidualizing discretion where the general rule does not provide sufficient flexibility. 
See id. at 721-22. The exercise of individualizing discretion, even if incorrectly ap-
plied, would result in the best program overall. The court also recognized that some 
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ministrative theory. The official is given freedom, not license. To 
what extent then should administrative officials be free, without 
judicial interference, to exercise individualizing discretion? The 
answer to this question affects our judgment as to the role courts 
play with respect to this type of discretion.1o 
As with the other forms of discretion, judicial authority over 
individualizing discretion is limited. Unlike the others, the con-
straints are not tied to judges' ability to exercise this type of dis-
cretion themselves. Judges are at least as able as bureaucrats to 
evaluate the individual adjustment of the rules. Although imple-
menting officials do develop experience by handling individual 
cases within their particular program, this experience does not 
make them substantially superior to the courts in a given case. 
Because administrative officials have no clear advantage in the 
exercise of individualizing discretion, judicial review is limited 
only by practical considerations such as administrative and judi-
cial economy. Restrained judicial review protects courts from the 
burden of actively supervising the mass of individualizing deci-
sions and protects the agencies, which would find it difficult to 
administer these programs if their individual decisions were fre-
quently subjected to close judicial scrutiny. Thus, even though re-
viewing courts have the capacity to become involved in specific 
individual decisions, they are usually constrained by practical con-
siderations from doing so,ll 
Judicial restraint then must be exercised with considerable flex-
ibility. Courts should generally consider correcting the adminis-
trative adjustments in individual decisions and should sometimes 
do so.12 From these observations we might evolve a strategy for 
arbitrary or irrational decisions may be made; however, protection can be afforded by 
individual review. Id. at 723. 
10. The Supreme Court has held that courts have similar types of discretion to 
fine tune the law. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 312 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). Nevertheless, it 
would seem that courts do not have discretion to allow statutorily proscribed conduct 
to continue. See Platter, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. 
REV. 524, 532 (1982). 
11. Judge Friendly, for example, urged with respect to judicial review of individu-
alizing discretion in the mass justice systems: 
[J]udicial review in the area of mass justice has largely been limited to 
questions of fair procedure, and there has been little attempt to obtain 
review for lack of substantial evidence or even for arbitrariness or capri-
ciousness. Would that it may remain so! The spectacle of a new source of 
litigation of this magnitude is frightening .... Surely this is an area where 
courts should exercise self-restraint; the agencies can promote this by fair 
procedures and adequate statements of reasons, remembering that one 
sufficiently outrageous example may burst the dike. 
Friendly, supra note 8, at 1294-95. 
12. See J. MAsHAW, C. GoETZ, F. GoODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CAR-
ROW, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEAlS 136-37 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEAlS]. 
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review of individualizing discretion. 
The court starts with the underlying general rule and must ex-
amine the extent to which the official's individualizing decision is 
permitted by the administrative scheme. This evaluation requires 
the court to ensure that the official has chosen the correct general 
rule and has correctly interpreted it. Indeed, the court must as-
sure that the decisionmaker exercised individualizing discretion 
and was not unduly wedded to the general rule. This is a question 
of law, and our system of judicial review instructs the court to de-
cide whether it agrees with the agency.1a 
Having approved the official's legal judgment, the court then be-
gins to evaluate the core discretionary decision. The court's re-
view of the core discretionary decision is very limited. This 
limited scrutiny is usually expressed in our judicial review system 
by a standard that instructs courts to tolerate a relatively high risk 
of error.14 The word formula traditionally used is expressed as an 
arbitrariness standard or an "abuse" or "excess" of discretion stan-
dard. Because review of individualizing discretion relates to im-
permissible deviations from a general rule, it sometimes seems 
appropriate to use the word formulas "excess" or "abuse" of dis-
cretion. Nevertheless, in attitude this review mirrors arbitrari-
ness review, and hence the two standards tend to overlap. They 
both express restraint aimed at controlling only for extreme risk 
of potential error. This evaluation depends on the context in 
which it is made; therefore, greater precision as to how a review-
ing court should apply those standards to individualizing discre-
tion is needed. In undertaking such review of individualizing 
discretion, the court might make the following judgments. 
First, the court must determine the extent to which the agency 
13. This was the focus of the Section of Administrative Law of the American Bar 
Association recommendation as to review of discretion. It would amend section 706 to 
allow courts to "set aside" agency action if "[t]he agency has relied on factors that may 
not be taken into account under, or has ignored factors that must be taken into ac-
count under, any of the sources of law listed." Section of Administrative Law, Ameri-
can Bar Association, A Restatement of Scope-of-Review Doctrine (adopted Feb. 8, 
1986), reprinted in 38 An. L. REv. 235 (1986) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report]. The 
chairman of the relevant section committee, Ronald Levin, explained: 
The inquiry prescribed in§ (b)(2) is often characterized as one element 
in "abuse of discretion" review. Since the inquiry becomes relevant only 
when the agency has been found to be (or is assumed to be) wielding some 
discretionary authority, it is natural to say that the inquiry bears upon 
whether the agency "abused" or misused its discretion. But it is more 
helpful to characterize the inquiry as an aspect of the court's law-declaring 
function. For, whereas "abuse of discretion" review is commonly con-
ceived as a very deferential standard, the§ (b)(2) inquiry is not a deferen-
tial one (except in the limited sense explained under§ (f)). Of course, the 
broader the delegation Congress intended, the fewer the constraints that 
the statute can be correctly construed to impose; but the identification of 
those constraints is a matter for which primary decisional responsibility 
rests with the judiciary. 
Levin, supra note 5, at 250-51; accord Levin, Federal Scope-of-Review Standards: A 
Preliminary Restatement, 37 An. L. REV. 95, 108 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Levin, 
Preliminary Restatement]. 
14. 2 C. KOCH, supra note 1, § 9.6, at 96-106. 
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has reached a decision that is faithful to the spirit of the applicable 
rule and the administrative scheme.15 The court must therefore 
ensure that the official's individual decision has not strayed an im-
permissible distance beyond the boundaries of the general rule; 
the official is to make individualizing adjustments in the general 
rule, not ignore or distort it. If there appears to be sufficient dan-
ger that the adjustment cannot be justified within the scope of the 
general rule, the court might reject the individual decision. 
Next, the court must consider the propriety of the adjustment 
in the relevant rule. How an official decides that fairness or jus-
tice requires some modification in the rules, however, is somewhat 
mystical. Some force other than a literal reading of the rules 
drives the official to exercise individualizing discretion. The sys-
tem depends on the official being motivated by values that will 
benefit both the individual and society. Thus, in evaluating the 
official's movement from the general rule to the individual deci-
sion, the court should limit its review to evaluating the relation-
ship between the individualizing and the applicable rules. If the 
individualizing is consistent with a plausible individual adjust-
ment of the applicable rules, the reviewing court should not ex-
amine further the personal mental process that led the official to 
the individual decision. 
Nonetheless, the court must ensure that the individualizing de-
cision was the product of the kind of intellectual consideration 
that is likely to result in a sound individualizing decision. The 
court should ask, for example, whether the decisionmaking pro-
cess incorporated reasonably discoverable facts and weighed all 
relevant factors.16 In short, courts must ensure that the individu-
alizing decisionmaker took a "hard look" at the decisions.17 
The court must also consider impermissible external pressures 
on the discretionary decisionmaking process. Care must be exer-
cised, however, because officials are to some degree expected to 
bring to bear certain factors not directly related to the implemen-
tation of the general rule - factors such as experience or, some-
times, public opinion. The court should not be concerned that 
such proper extraneous factors skew the decision. Other extrane-
ous factors cannot be permitted, and the court should control for 
15. The revised model state AP A describes this review as "outside the range of 
discretion delegated to the agency by any provision of law." MODEL STATE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr § 5-116(8)(i) (1961) (emphasis added). 
16. However, this does not warrant a retreat to formalism. 
17. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), 
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the 
Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509,511 (1974) (Judge Harold Leventhal elabo-
rating on his decision in Greater Boston); see also infra note 99. 
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the potential effect of such impermissible factors as political pres-
sure or personal bias. 
In addition to these inquiries, in some selected cases the court 
may be driven to evaluate the probability of error in the individual 
decision itself. Review for potential error, however, must recog-
nize the benefits of leaving to the decisionmaker freedom to make 
some mistakes as to individuals.18 This means that the court 
should become directly involved in the core discretionary decision 
only under extreme circumstances. However, if it finds the 
probability of error to be unacceptably high in an individualizing 
decision it chooses to evaluate in this manner, it may find that the 
decision is arbitrary or an abuse of discretion. The court must 
remember that the arbitrariness or abuse standards always limit 
review to the extent of the risk of error, not error itself. That the 
court disagrees with the core discretionary decision is irrelevant as 
long as there is an adequate probability that the official might be 
right. 
The purpose of individualizing discretion is to allow the agency 
to fine tune the rules - administrative, judicial, or statutory - to 
do individual justice; the court controls only for extreme risk of 
error in such judgments. In Airmark Corp. v. FAA, 19 for example, 
Airmark and other small air carriers sued the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) for failure to exempt them from aircraft 
noise regulation deadlines, and several large air carriers inter-
vened. Congress, in several pieces of legislation, set deadlines for 
noise abatement for both foreign and domestic air carriers.20 In 
doing so, it intended that the FAA should have the authority to 
grant necessary exceptions.21 The conference committee set out 
criteria for granting these exemptions,22 and the FAA adopted 
compliance rules that incorporated them.23 The FAA received 145 
petitions for exemptions and granted fifteen.24 
Both sides argued that the FAA's exemption authority was 
closely confined; the smaller carriers argued that the legislation 
compelled the agency to adopt a more lenient exemption policy, 
whereas the larger carriers argued that the agency's rules limited 
its exemption authority to "the most exceptional circum-
stances."25 The court found that the regulatory scheme incorpo-
rated the authority to use the exemptions to individualize where 
strict compliance would do undue harm. As the court stated, 
"[T]he FAA has broad discretion to determine whether the public 
18. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. 
19. 758 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
20. Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act§ 302, 49 U.S.C. § 2122 (1982); Fed-
eral Aviation Act§ 611, 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1982). 
21. Airmark, 758 F.2d at 687 (citing H.R. REP. No. 715, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 89, 115, 124). 
22. See H.R. REP. No. 715, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 89, 123-24. 
23. See 45 Fed. Reg. 79,312 (1980). 
24. Airmark, 758 F.2d at 688. 
25. Id. at 689. 
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interest would or would not be served by granting noncompliant 
carriers exemptions .... "26 Having recognized this broad individ-
ualizing discretion, the court considered "whether the FAA has 
exercised that authority in an arbitrary and capricious fashion."27 
The court thus limited its review authority, but did assert its au-
thority to delve into the core decision. As it turned out, the court 
considered itself compelled to find that the agency's individualiz-
ing was "grossly inconsistent and patently arbitrary."28 
Even in the face of this extremely adverse reaction to the FAA's 
individualizing decisions, the court concluded that the agency, and 
not the court, should determine when exemptions should be 
granted or denied.29 The FAA retained broad discretion to indi-
vidualize to protect against harsh application of its rules and rele-
vant statutory provisions, although the court quite properly 
intervened when the individualizing decision was clearly inconsis-
tent with the expressed standards. 
The key is not whether the court was correct in holding the 
FAA's action arbitrary but rather how the court handled review of 
the individualizing discretion. First, the court recognized the 
value and appropriateness of individualizing discretion in general; 
it did not dwell on the legitimacy of such a delegation of discre-
tion. With these preliminary barriers out of the way, the court 
quickly reached the decisive question of the exercise of the indi-
vidualizing discretion itself.30 The court quite properly compared 
this action with the thrust of the standards as gleaned from the 
relevant statutory provisions and found that the decision was not a 
permissible adjustment. 
In Sang Seup Shin v. INS, 31 the D.C. Circuit went beyond the 
faithfulness of the individualizing to the general rule in the stat-
ute and tested for the probability of error in the individualizing. 
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) refused to reopen a deportation deci-
sion even though the petitioner's wife had attained American citi-
zenship.32 Conceding that the BIA's discretion concerning 
petitions-to-reopen is extremely broad, the court nevertheless 
found that the BIA had exceeded the boundaries of that discre-
26. Id. at 691. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 692. 
29. Id. at 695. 
30. This differs from some of the other forms of discretion. Even where the arbi-
trariness standard applies, that standard still permits considerable judicial authority 
over this type of discretion. 
31. 750 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
32. Id. at 123-24. 
1986] 477 
tion. 33 The BIA had not explained apparently inconsistent appli-
cations,34 and the absence of reasoning or consistency was itself 
inconsistent with the grant of individualizing discretion. There-
fore, the majority felt compelled to delve more deeply into the 
core discretionary decision.35 The majority evaluated the individ-
ual decision and found a substantial likelihood that the agency was 
mistaken in striking a balance between the "special and weighty 
equity" of relative status36 and the immigrant's disregard of the 
law.37 Although the court competently evaluated the exercise of 
individualizing discretion, it probably should not become this in-
volved in every such exercise.38 
Whether a particular exercise of individualizing discretion war-
rants direct judicial involvement is a difficult threshold choice for 
a court. In deciding to review a specific individualizing decision, 
courts should not be criticized as long as they are highly selective 
in choosing to do so. 
Courts might properly examine the core individualizing decision 
when there appears to be a pattern. When the relevant exercise of 
discretion might be an example of consistent conduct by the 
agency, the court might choose to evaluate the need for correction. 
Because consistent misjudgments as to individualizing discre-
tion are more appropriate for review, agency rules intended to 
guide that discretion might also be more closely reviewed than 
other types of rules. Rules that set a pattern for individualized 
decisionmaking by officials involve neither special expertise nor 
policy; they simply add as much consistency as possible to those 
individualizing decisions. A court might review closely an individ-
ual application of the guidance contained in such a rule. A court 
can certainly evaluate such guidance just as it can evaluate a pat-
tern of individual decisions. 
Individualizing discretion is thus a very special form of adminis-
trative activity. It allows the process to be sensitive, as well as fair 
and efficient; hence a reviewing court should approach this type of 
discretion with a positive attitude. Fortunately, most judges who 
are familiar with the administrative process recognize the value of 
individualizing discretion and instinctively attempt to review it in 
a manner that will preserve its positive aspects. 
33. ld. at 126. 
34. Id. at 127. 
35. See id. at 125. The dissent asserted that the BIA had explained both its failure 
to reopen and the possibility that this decision might appear inconsistent with prior 
decisions. Id. at 128 (Starr, J., dissenting). 
36. Id. at 127. 
37. See id. at 126. 
38. The court could have left this to the agency's individualizing discretion despite 
the court's ability to make its own decision, which may even have a higher probability 
of correctness, because the system demands such restraint. As the dissent pointed 
out, the majority failed to adequately consider the implications of not exercising re-
straint. Id. at 129-30. 
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A second use of the term discretion connotes a mandate to com-
plete a task begun by the authorizing body. Typically, the term is 
used when Congress has conveyed power to an agency through 
generalized, vague, or incomplete instructions. Statutory authori-
zations often contain standards such as "feasible"39 and "public in-
terest."40 Although these terms can invoke agency policymaking 
discretion,41 they more frequently demand a simple extension of 
the legislative mandate to carry forward the work begun by the 
authorizing statute.42 
This use of the term discretion involves a readily accepted fun-
damental attribute of administrative agencies: the power to fill in 
the details.43 When instructions are general, vague, or incomplete, 
the agency has authority to execute the will of Congress. There-
fore, I call this executing discretion. 
Executing discretion may be intended by Congress without be-
ing expressed. Congress, for example, often legislates in broad 
terms on the assumption that the agency will fill in the necessary 
details, and most enabling legislation contains some degree of exe-
39. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 500 (1981) (strik-
ing down agency efforts to limit the term "feasible"). 
40. In the famous Loeb Rhoades case, the SEC found a "wilful" and "serious" vio-
lation of the Securities Act but, nonetheless, refused to suspend the broker-dealer 
license because it found that a suspension was not in the public interest under that 
statute. In re Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co. and Dominick & Dominick, 38 S.E.C. 843, 
855 (1959). 
41. See infra notes 63-124 and accompanying text. 
42. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
provides a pure example of this form of discretion. Id. § 552(b). Within this exemp-
tion, Congress attempted to give guidance as to the proper interpretation of the non-
disclosure provisions of other statutes. In doing so, it distinguished two types of 
withholding authorizations: those clearly defining the document to be withheld and 
those giving the agency "discretion to withhold." The latter permitted the withhold-
ing as an exercise of discretion when accompanied by "particular criteria." That is, 
Congress permitted denial of a FOIA request in the exercise of agency discretion only 
in the form of an extension of the withholding mandate. Congress did not intend to 
authorize discretion to withhold more broadly. The discretion referred to here is not 
the authority to individualize or to make disclosure policy; Congress prohibited both 
under the FOIA. Congress's use of the term discretion is limited to the authority to 
carry forward a statutory direction. Indeed, the direction must be much more precise 
than we often find supporting this form of discretion; it must establish "particular 
criteria." Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 
(1980). 
43. H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BET-
TER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 14 (1962) (suggesting that the agency function as to 
general statutory language is "to define and clarify it - to canalize the broad stream 
into a number of narrower ones"); Stewart, The Limits of Administrative Law, in 
THE COURTS: SEPARATION OF POWERS 78 (B. Goulet ed. 1983) ("Administrative discre-
tion is most evident when agencies adopt regulations in order to implement open-
ended statutes."). 
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cuting discretion- often a good deal.44 Although executing dis-
cretion is often intended, it can also be granted inadvertently 
when Congress unintentionally leaves questions for the agency to 
answer.45 Indeed, some incompleteness, generality, and vagueness 
seem inevitable. 
Whatever the source of executing discretion, the reviewing 
court has substantial authority over the exercise of such discre-
tion. Although courts no longer seriously consider striking down 
executing discretion as an illegal delegation, the law may impose 
stricter scrutiny of the exercise of executing discretion than of the 
other types of discretion. In addition, when the agency is filling in 
gaps unintentionally left in the legislation, a reviewing court 
might properly scrutinize agency action even more closely than 
when Congress clearly intended the agency to fill in the details. 
A functional distinction between executing discretion and the 
other types of discretion is the absence of an overwhelming need 
for administrative freedom and a less-than-clear intention to grant 
such freedom. As with the other uses of discretion, executing dis-
cretion connotes the freedom to make mistakes and, to some ex-
tent, to fall short of the highest possible standards of good 
government. Although such freedom is accepted as a necessary 
condition of the establishment of an administrative process, the 
nature of its grant does seem to give a reviewing court more room 
to reevaluate the agency's exercise of this form of discretion. In 
other words, the agency usually assumes the authority to fill in 
the details and, although this assumption of power is generally 
quite proper and consistent with administrative law theory, courts 
need be less constrained by the danger of interfering with neces-
sary freedom of action. 
Another difference is executing discretion's close relationship to 
questions of law. Executing discretion raises issues related, by 
their nature, to questions of law. The reviewing court's authority 
over questions of law is plenary; it can substitute its judgment for 
the agency's on those questions.46 Review of executing discretion 
often combines questions of law with questions of agency judg-
ment. As a result, the court's authority to review questions of law 
leads to stricter scrutiny of executing discretion than of other 
forms of discretion. 
Also, in terms of comparative institutional competence, courts 
are less constrained in approaching administrative decisions in-
44. Indeed, this sort of legislation has been the focal point of the nondelegation 
debate. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 131-34 
(1980). But even advocates of the nondelegation doctrine do not seriously contend 
that legislation can be so detailed that the agency has no freedom in execution. 
Therefore, this debate can be characterized as a disagreement over the permissible 
degree of executing discretion. 
45. See Lawrence v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 759 F.2d 767, 772 (9th 
Cir. 1985) ("When the legislature has left a gap in a statute as to the details of its 
administration," a court should accept a reasonable statutory interpretation made by 
the agency.). 
46. 2 C. KOCH, supra note 1, § 9.18, at 131-34. 
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volving a substantial amount of executing discretion.47 For gener-
ations, reviewing courts have been limited by the concept of 
expertise.48 As to executing discretion, however, the force of com-
parative expertise is not as strong as in many other areas of ad-
ministrative action. There are competing expertises at work in 
the exercise of such discretion. The agency may know more about 
the particular discipline and to that extent the agency's judgment 
should be lightly reviewed. Executing discretion, however, also 
involves questions, such as interpretations of law, over which the 
court has superior expertise. Therefore, as to this variety of dis-
cretion, more than any of the others, the reviewing court must 
determine whether it or the agency is more competent with re-
spect to the particular judgment.49 
Although for these reasons the reviewing court may and should 
delve more deeply into executing discretion, it should show re-
straint. The authorization, incomplete or vague though it might 
be, does convey a standard by which the agency decision should be 
evaluated; the court is compelled to adhere to the standards that 
can be gleaned from the delegation.50 The meaning of these stan-
dards as developed by the agency has been given substantial defer-
ence, 51 which should act as an additional restraint on a reviewing 
court in rejecting the agency's judgment as to the best means to 
extend the legislative judgments. Although the agency does not 
always have superior institutional competence in the exercise of 
executing discretion, such discretion can involve the agency's ex-
pertise in a way that should discourage judicial interference.52 
Thus, the court should ensure that the agency stays true to the 
spirit of that scheme, but it should not stray into implementing 
judgments best left to the agency.ss 
47. See Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARv. L. REv. 
1277, 1335 (1984) (Because judges are insulated from political pressures, they are "able 
to act in an appropriately ad hoc and nonbureaucratic way and to invite wide partici-
pation by representatives of competing interests."). 
48. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 92-93 (1943) (Chenery I) (conclud-
ing that the SEC had "accumulate[ d) an experience and insight denied to others"). 
49. There are also few resource-allocation reasons to dissuade a court from inquir-
ing into these decisions. There are few instances of executing discretion and judicial 
review will have broad impact. 
50. Whether or not the agency has unbridled discretion over a given issue must 
receive close judicial scrutiny; if it does have unbridled discretion, the exercise of that 
discretion cannot be reviewed. See infra text accompanying note 156. 
51. E.g., Board of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 251 (1978); 
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). 
52. E.g., Beerly v. DOT, 768 F.2d 942, 945-46 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 
1184 (1986). The expertise here involves giving detailed expression to the general leg-
islative will and must be distinguished from the expert judgment that supports poli-
cymaking discretion. See infra text accompanying notes 72-73. 
53. Flynn v. Shultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1195 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 94 
(1985). 
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Because the core decision is similar in nature to a question of 
law,54 however, the court should often look closely at the imple-
menting action itself.55 Because the power to extend the explicit 
delegation is derived from generality, incompleteness, and vague-
ness, the court must examine the basic support for the action. The 
agency's completion of the delegation may or may not improve the 
administrative scheme. Thus, review of executing discretion -
and hence application of the arbitrariness and abuse standards in 
that context - affords the reviewing court considerable breadth. 
In Coal Exporters Association of the United States v. United 
States, 56 the D.C. Circuit recognized that some administrative pro-
grams are designed around agency discretion to implement incom-
plete or vague standards. Having conceded the existence and 
importance of such discretion, the court nevertheless concluded 
that the agency's decision was inconsistent with the congressional 
design.57 The case involved the exemption provision of the Stag-
gers Rail Act of 1980.58 The Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) acquired executing discretion through broad statutory 
standards such as "not necessary to carry out the transportation 
policy of [the Act]" and "not needed to protect shippers from the 
abuse of market power."59 The court recognized that the freedom 
granted by executing discretion still must be exercised as a proper 
extension of the legislative scheme and the agency's implementing 
decision must be evaluated as an acceptable extension of that 
scheme: 
Here we admit that the Commission has substantial discretion 
54. For example, in Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 
313 (1985), the court found that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) failed to 
recognize that the broad standard conferred executing discretion and that the NLRB 
acted improperly by not exercising it. Id. at 942, 950, 956. The NLRB interpreted 
section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) as compelling a narrow defini-
tion of "concerted activities." Id. at 942 n.1 (quoting section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 157 (1982)). However, the court disagreed with the NLRB. As this is also a question 
of law, the court was perfectly correct in instructing the agency of the boundaries of 
that discretion and compelling it to exercise that discretion according to the breadth 
of the legislative standard. Id. at 948 (stating that "the Board's opinion is wrong as it 
holds that the agency is without discretion to construe [the broad statutory 
standard]"). 
55. This approach may justify the Supreme Court's opinion in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984), which at least one commentator found confusing. 
See Comment, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Court and the Scope of Broad 
Discretion in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 715-16 (1986). 
56. 745 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2151 (1985). 
57. 745 F.2d at 96. 
58. 49 u.s.c. § 10505 (1982). 
59. Coal Exporters Ass'n, 745 F.2d at 79. Neither standard significantly confines 
the agency, but the court did not discuss whether the broad delegation violated the 
nondelegation doctrine. Instead, the court accepted the propriety of an administrative 
scheme designed around standards that give the agency tremendous freedom in its 
executing decisions: 
[The act is] a recognition that an administrative agency is better suited 
than Congress to evaluate on a continuing basis the specific need for the 
various aspects of the regulatory scheme in particular contexts. There is 
no doubt that the exemption provision was intended to give ICC very 
broad authority [but it also incorporated legislative standards]. 
Id. at 82. 
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as to how to carry out Congress's instruction concerning the ac-
commodation of shipper and rail carrier interests, but wherever 
the bounds of discretion are, we have no doubt that the agency's 
accommodation, as announced and applied in this case, "is not 
one that Congress would have sanctioned."60 
Therefore, in reviewing executing discretion, as with the other 
forms of discretion, the court has overriding authority to reverse 
agency questions of law,61 limited only by self-restraint and pre-
sumption of regularity.62 The agency's executing discretion takes 
over when it is acting within legislative boundaries, and its discre-
tion has primacy that must be recognized by the reviewing court. 
Nonetheless, the court can subject core discretionary decisions to 
considerable scrutiny. 
C. Policymaking Discretion 
The third use of the term discretion covers the authority to 
make "policy."63 Policymaking is considered particularly appro-
priate for administrative agencies.64 Conversely, even under cur-
rent theories of judicial license, courts are not primarily 
responsible for making policy. Policymaking is often character-
ized as the zenith of administrative authority: the point at which 
courts have the least authority and agencies the most. It is not 
rare for this authority to be referred to as discretion. 
When exercised by an agency, policymaking discretion appears 
similar to executing discretion in that legislative guidance is very 
general; however, it differs in a fundamental way. Policymaking 
discretion is not merely the power to extend legislation or fill in 
details. In policymaking, the agency is performing functions simi-
lar to those performed by the legislative body itself rather than 
60. Id. at 96 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984)). 
61. See, e.g., Citizens State Bank v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 209, 217 (8th Cir. 1984) ("The 
scope of an agency's discretion is limited to its powers ... a matter suitable for judicial 
resolution."). 
62. 2 C. KOCH, supra note 1, at 89. 
63. Policy is an imprecise word. Policy includes those decisions that advance or 
protect some collective goal of the community as a whole (as opposed to those deci-
sions that respect or secure some individual or group right). See Dworkin, Hard Cases, 
88 HAR.v. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1975), reprinted in R. DwoRKIN, supra note 2, chap. 4. 
Policy decisions are based on aggregate values; they do not focus on individual goals or 
on the resolution of individual situations. Obviously, the two are somewhat interre-
lated but it is possible to separate those decisions that reflect general or societal goals 
from other types of decisions. 
64. Policymaking is the major work of government. While modern government is 
expected to provide individual dispute-resolution machinery, the fundamental pur-
pose of government is to carry out general societal goals. As has often been observed, 
in our complicated society the legislative branch cannot perform all or perhaps even a 
major part of this function. See generally Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administra-
tors Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985). Thus, agencies 
are often given major policymaking functions. 
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expanding on the work of the legislative body.65 Whereas the 
agency follows a defined path when exercising executing discre-
tion, it defines the path itself in exercising poliqymaking 
discretion. 66 
A grant of policymaking discretion is not without guidance, but 
the guidance defines societal goals and thus differs in kind from 
the guidance that accompanies executing discretion. The legisla-
ture assigns the agency such discretion because it sees an advan-
tage in injecting the consideration of societal goals into the 
administrative process. 
Policymaking discretion, more than any other form of adminis-
trative action, directly involves two major principles of adminis-
trative law: public interest and expertise. The broad goal of 
public interest is the administrative system's effort to build quasi-
democratic values into administrative decisions. The incorpora-
tion of expertise attempts to consciously shift the decision into the 
hands of a body specially designed for that purpose. 
First, agency policymaking should and can be guided by public 
interest, meaning that the agency can make these decisions with 
attention to public will. In short, Congress, in assigning poli-
cymaking to the agency, did not intend the search for public opin-
ion to end. The assignment of policymaking discretion shifted 
responsibility for further development of public opinion to the 
agency. In some ways, of course, the agency's mechanisms for dis-
cerning public opinion are inferior to the legislature's and the as-
signment to the agency is the result of other considerations.67 In 
other instances, the delegation evidences a desire on the part of 
the legislature that the agency continue being sensitive to the pub-
lic will.68 
In policymaking, the agency must strike society's balance from 
among competing values.69 Indeed, some policymaking discretion 
is given to the agency so that it - not political officials - will 
create policy, perhaps in an atmosphere of objectivity. Sometimes 
the delegation ensures that the agency rather than the legislature 
65. See Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 
1, 22 (1985). 
66. For example, section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act empowers the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to determine what practices are "unfair methods of 
competition." The legislative history shows that the term had a recognized meaning 
at the time of passage. See 51 CONG. REC. 14,929 (1914) (statement of Rep. Covington). 
Therefore, to some extent this delegation confers what I have called executing discre-
tion to define that term more concretely. However, over the years the FTC has as-
sumed the authority, with judicial blessing, to make policy that implements the spirit 
of that legislation rather than merely defining its applicability to specific practices. 
See, e.g., FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); FTC v. Motion Picture 
Advertising Serv. Co., 345 U.S. 914 (1953). But see FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 
353-55 (1941) (holding that the FTC may not regulate matters traditionally left to 
local customs). 
67. The agency, however, may be superior to the legislature in finding public 
opinion, e.g., regional rulemaking hearings. 
68. See Mashaw, supra note 64, at 92. 
69. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132 (1961). 
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will bear the brunt of the inevitable dissatisfaction with one choice 
as among valid and desirable alternatives.7o 
Courts, generally speaking, lack the ability to find public opin-
ion. Indeed, the judiciary is to some extent intentionally anti-
democratic and certainly should not be looking for the popular re-
sult.71 True, agencies are also somewhat resistant to public opin-
ion but they do tend to be more responsive to popular will than 
are courts. Thus, agencies are better policymakers because of 
some sensitivity to public interest. 
Second, policymaking discretion represents the ultimate assign-
ment to expert agency judgment. In some sense, expertise is 
merely the acquisition of superior knowledge, and the agency can 
surpass judges in this regard. However, expertise includes an-
other asset: superior ability to synthesize information into a judg-
ment. Even assuming that courts could accumulate particular 
information, they cannot make the same use of the information as 
the expert agencies. Administrative policymaking often repre-
sents this second asset of expertise.72 Courts cannot, even with all 
of the necessary information, acquire the requisite expert judg-
ment as to accomplishment of societal goals; an agency is assigned 
or occasionally created to bring this kind of expert judgment to a 
particular problem.73 This ability justifies the exercise of poli-
cymaking discretion by agencies. It is a major reason why the leg-
islature assigned the task to the agency and why courts should 
meticulously avoid circumventing that choice.74 
When this broader perspective is important, the agency rather 
than the court should have the dominant role. Courts react to in-
dividual cases and rarely have the luxury of a broad overview of 
the problem. Moreover, administrative policymakers have expert 
advice readily available, whereas courts have an inferior capacity 
for obtaining such advice. Thus the agency's policymaking is supe-
rior to the court's both in obtaining information and making judg-
ments based on that information. 
Further, the judicial process is a very poor policymaking proce-
70. J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND 
AMERICAN GoVERNMENT 34-35 (1978). 
71. See J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, PHILoSOPHY OF THE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO JURISPRUDENCE 96 (1984). 
72. See generally McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Adminis-
trative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and 
OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729 (1979). 
73. J. FREEDMAN, supra note 70, at 44-46. 
74. Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: 
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973). But see Twerki, Wein-
stein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-
Design Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495, 497 (1976) ("continued judi-
cial presence in overseeing product safety standards remains necessary"). 
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dure, whereas some administrative processes are superior poli-
cymaking mechanisms.75 Rulemaking is an excellent policy-
making mechanism.76 Even individual administrative adjudica-
tions seem superior to judicial adjudications for this purpose. For 
example, administrative adjudications can seek public opinion 
through broad intervention. 77 An agency can also seek comments 
from interested parties when it decides to make policy in an adju-
dication, even if it does not choose to undertake rulemaking.78 
Moreover, an agency is more apt to announce policy prospectively, 
often without applying it to the parties in the adjudication, and 
thereby avoid mixing policymaking with the resolution of individ-
ual rights or duties. 
Not only is extreme judicial restraint in reviewing policymaking 
discretion supported by administrative superiority in expertise 
and ability to discern public interest, it is also supported by the 
need for considerable freedom in the exercise of its policymaking 
discretion. Although present in many forms of discretion, this 
need for freedom may be highest in policymaking.79 Policymaking 
decisions cannot be made with great confidence and cannot or 
should not be tested very strictly. Because any policymaking in-
volves substantial uncertainty, it is important that courts do not 
inadvertently assume authority they are neither intended to have 
nor capable of exercising. In the context of policymaking, courts 
should not evaluate the decision too critically lest judicial poli-
cymaking judgment replace administrative policymaking. 
Modern courts, especially appellate courts, are in the habit of 
making policy-based decisions80 despite considerable debate over 
whether judges should do so.s1 It is difficult for judges to abandon 
this habit of thought when reviewing agency action, especially in 
an era when distrust of government bureaucracies is at its highest. 
Whatever the advisability of courts relying on policy arguments in 
other adjudications, they should rarely do so when reviewing the 
75. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1168-69 (D.C. Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980). 
76. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 6.38 (2d ed. 1978). 
77. See Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rulemaking: Some Recent Devel-
opments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51, 83-85. 
78. E.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 765 (1969). 
79. But see Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1281, 1307-09 (1976) (judges are uniquely qualified to oversee public policy 
decisions). 
80. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921) ("Here, 
indeed, is the point of contact between the legislator's work and [the judge's] .... 
Each indeed is legislating within the limits of his competence. No doubt the limits for 
the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in 
the law."); Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the 
Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975) (stating that denial of judicial 
discretion conflicts with the usual perception of the role of judges). 
81. Compare Greenawalt, Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decisions, 11 GA. L. REV. 
991 (1977) (rejecting Dworkin's view that judges do, and should, decide complex civil 
cases on grounds of principle rather than policy) with Dworkin, A Reply by Ronald 
Dworkin, in RONALD DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE 263-68 
(M. Cohen ed. 1984) (arguing that Greenawalt interprets the concept of "principle" 
too narrowly). 
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policy judgments of a body that has been assigned the policymak-
ing task and was designed to implement it.s2 
Expertise, incorporation of public views, and the need for free-
dom in the decisionmaker combine to give courts a very limited 
role in review of policymaking discretion. As with individualizing 
and executing discretion, this limited judicial review is usually ex-
pressed by the arbitrariness or abuse of discretion standards, but 
these standards convey a particularly restricted judicial role when 
applied to the exercise of policymaking discretion. These terms 
instruct the court to approach the exercise of administrative poli-
cymaking with an attitude of extreme restraint and a tolerance for 
a high risk of error. 
Unfortunately, the difficulty of distinguishing between policy 
and law sometimes misleads courts into overly active review. Con-
clusions of "law" also express broad societal goals, i.e., policy. Be-
cause courts are traditionally the final arbiters of questions of 
law,83 they are sometimes confused as to their authority when so-
cietal goals are involved. Even though both policy and law involve 
societal goals, however, there is a substantial difference. Ques-
tions of law involve the search for the policy embodied in a statute 
or evolved through the common law, whereas administrative poli-
cymaking involves policy questions of first impression (albeit 
under the guidance of the legislation). This fundamental distinc-
tion supports the vast difference between the judicial roles as to 
law and policy.s4 
An example of the impact of a mistake here is the D.C. Circuit's 
efforts in WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC.85 The case involved the 
Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) efforts to join the 
stampede towards deregulation. In a prior case, Citizens Commit-
tee to Save WEFM v. FCC, 86 the D.C. Circuit held that the FCC 
should hold a hearing when there was a protest of a radio broad-
caster's efforts to abandon a distinctive programming format.87 
After rulemaking, the FCC issued a policy statement disagreeing 
with WEFM, arguing that unregulated competition would better 
serve the public interest in diversity of entertainment.88 The FCC 
contended that its policy judgment should take precedence over 
82. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 685 F.2d 459, 517 
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for assuming a "role 
as high public protector of all that is good from perceived evils of the nuclear age"), 
rev'd, 462 U.S. 87 (1983). 
83. 2 C. KocH, supra note 1, § 9.18, at 131-35. 
84. For an expansive discussion of identifying questions of law, see Levin, supra 
note 65. 
85. 610 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 582 (1981). 
86. 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane). 
87. ld. at 266. 
88. WNCN, 610 F.2d at 841. 
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the court's judgm.ent.s9 
The court found that it "has neither the experience nor the con-
stitutional authority to make 'policy' as that word is under-
stood. . . . But in matters of interpreting the 'law' the final say is 
constitutionally committed to the judiciary."90 While recognizing 
that the "distinction between law and policy is never clear-cut," 
the court found that resolution of this controversy required an in-
terpretation of the Federal Communications Act "in which the ju-
dicial word is final."91 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the decision to per-
mit the market to decide program format was a question of policy 
rather than law.92 Thus, it held that the judicial function was ex-
tremely limited because the question was left to the ''broad discre-
tion" of the FCC. 93 The Court stated that because the appellate 
court had conceded "that it possessed neither the expertise nor 
the authority to make policy decisions in this area,"94 it should 
have permitted the agency to carry out the function for which it 
was designed.95 Although the Supreme Court used "deference" 
language in referring to the FCC's judgment, it meant that the 
reviewing court must show extreme restraint in reviewing a core 
policymaking decision. 96 
How then should a court review the exercise of policymaking 
discretion? The court has ultimate authority to determine 
whether Congress assigned responsibility to the agency to make 
decisions about a certain range of societal goals; this is a question 
of law. 97 Of course, as in WNCN, the court cannot usurp poli-
cymaking authority by doing more than simply defining the legis-
lative grant. Once the reviewing court has determined that the 
agency was properly exercising policymaking discretion, it has 
89. Id. at 845. 
90. Id. at 854-55. 
91. !d. at 855. The court also approached the controversy in terms of allocation of 
authority over factual questions: "To the extent that the Commission was not ques-
tioning this court's legal judgment, but was attempting to demonstrate that faulty 
premises underlay that judgment, we agree that it was within its competence as an 
agency better equipped to develop legislative-type facts than is this court." !d. It 
found, however, that the factfinding in support of the policy statement was inade-
quate; therefore, the factual conclusions did not contradict the court's legal judgment. 
See id. at 854-58. 
92. 450 U.S. at 592-99, 604. 
93. Id. at 594. 
94. Id. at 592. 
95. The Court explained: 
[W]e recognized [in FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 
436 U.S. 775 (1978)] that the Commission's decisions must sometimes rest 
on judgment and prediction rather than pure factual determinations .... 
These predictions are within the institutional competence of the Commis-
sion. Our opinions have repeatedly emphasized that the Commission's 
judgment regarding how the public interest is best served is entitled to 
substantial judicial deference. 
!d. at 594-96. 
96. See id. at 596, 598, 602-03. 
97. See Levin, supra note 65, at 16 (using discretion to mean policymaking 
discretion). 
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very little authority over the decision itsel£.98 The extent of this 
authority is best expressed by Judge Harold Leventhal's "hard 
look" doctrine: the court should ensure that the agency has taken 
a hard look at the policy question, but once the court determines 
that the agency has undertaken a careful and complete analysis, 
the court's role with respect to the core discretionary decision 
comes to an abrupt end.99 
A clear example of the special problems a court faces with re-
spect to policymaking discretion is presented in Deukmejian v. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.100 Several groups of concerned 
citizens sought review of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) licensing decision. The D.C. Circuit concluded that, except 
for two minor matters, the NRC acted within its "legal discre-
tion."101 The court first looked at the statute to determine 
whether the decision was consistent with the administrative 
scheme's goals. 
The court then discussed the judiciary's role in nuclear regula-
tion and noted several occasions when the Supreme Court had ad-
monished the D.C. Circuit to stay out of nuclear policymaking.1o2 
Based on these past pronouncements, the court stated that the 
98. See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); Leventhal, supra note 17, at 511. 
99. Although Judge Leventhal's hard look doctrine might be applied to a variety 
of issues, e.g., supra note 17, it seems to be attached most consistently and comfortably 
to policymaking discretion. See Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 
1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177, 181; see also Sunstein, In Defense of the Hard Look: Judicial 
Activism and Administrative Law, 7 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 51 (1984); New York 
State Comm'n on Cable Television v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804, 807-08 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stat-
ing that when the agency has made a reasonable accommodation of conflicting poli-
cies, judicial review may only determine whether the agency has exceeded its 
authority or acted arbitrarily). 
As Judge McGowan stated: 
What we are entitled to at all events is a careful identification by the 
Secretary, when his proposed standards are challenged, of the reasons why 
he chooses to follow one course rather than another. Where the choice 
purports to be based on the existence of certain determinable facts, the 
Secretary must, in form as well as substance, find those facts from evi-
dence in the record. By the same token, when the Secretary is obliged to 
make policy judgments where no factual certainties exist or where facts 
alone do not provide the answer, he should so state and go on to identify 
the considerations he found persuasive. 
Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see Hercules, 
Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91,106 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 
598 F.2d 62, 82, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
100. 751 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd on rehearing sub nom. San Luis Obispo 
Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 789 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en bane). 
101. 751 F.2d at 1293. 
102. Id. at 1294. In Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court stated: 
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The fundamental policy questions appropriately resolved in Congress and 
in the state legislature are not subject to reexamination in the federal 
courts under the guise of judicial review of agency action. Time may prove 
wrong the decision to develop nuclear energy, but it is Congress or the 
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AP A's abuse of discretion review did not allow the court to "seize 
upon the fortuity of appeal to usurp those governmental functions 
properly accorded the political branches," a term clearly intended 
to include both Congress and the agencies.103 The court held that 
its function was to determine if the agency had policymaking dis-
cretion104 and to ensure that the relevant decision, which involved 
issues at the "frontiers of science," did not transgress the bounda-
ries of agency discretion.105 Thus, the court recognized the basis 
for administrative policymaking discretion: democratic factors, 
agency expertise, and the advantages of the administrative process 
in those areas.106 
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.,107 the D.C. Circuit again fared poorly in its efforts to usurp 
authority over policymaking discretion. The Environmental Pro-
tection Agency allowed the states to consider each plant as a ''bub-
ble" including all of the plant's pollution-producing devices. As a 
result, equipment could be added or replaced without a permit so 
long as the total emissions of the plant, or bubble, were not in-
creased. The D.C. Circuit struck down the plant-wide definition 
of stationary source;10s the Supreme Court reversed, criticizing the 
appellate court for adopting a "static judicial definition."109 
Because the Supreme Court found that it is to review judgments, 
not opinions, it evaluated the appellate court's holding. The Court 
noted that if the will of Congress is clear in the statute, the agency 
must follow that will. However, if the statute is silent or ambigu-
States within their appropriate agencies which must eventually make that 
judgment. 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (emphasis in original). 
Similarly, in the sequel to Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court again admonished 
the D.C. Circuit: 
Resolution of these fundamental policy questions lies, however, with Con-
gress and the agencies to which Congress has delegated authority . . . . 
Congress has assigned the courts only the limited, albeit important, task of 
reviewing agency action to determine whether the agency conformed with 
controlling statutes. 
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 
(1983). 
103. Deukmejian, 751 F.2d at 1296. 
104. "Ultimate resolution of contested agency actions properly lies within the 
province of the courts. Because courts lack the scientific and technical expertise of 
regulatory agencies, however, the judicial role on review is limited to determining 
whether the agency has complied with relevant statutory and regulatory require-
ments." ld. at 1307. 
105. I d. Given its dissertation on the role of courts, the D.C. Circuit was somewhat 
disingenuous in reviewing some very specific scientific conclusions of the NRC. De-
spite disagreeing with those conclusions, it failed to remand- no doubt in the hope of 
avoiding Supreme Court review. 
106. Judge Patricia Wald would have reversed the agency on a specific technical 
finding. She is obviously confident that she can make technical decisions through 
traditional appellate process that will improve on the agency's technical judgments 
made through scientific methods. Wald, Making "Informed" Decisions on the 
District of Columbia Circuit, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 135, 153 (1982). 
107. 467 u.s. 837 (1984). 
108. ld. at 842. 
109. Id. 
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ous with respect to a specific issue, then the agency, not the court, 
has policymaking authority. The judicial function is limited to en-
suring that the "agency's answer is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute."110 The agency's authority is not simply 
the discretion to complete what the statute began; rather it is the 
authority to design the regulatory scheme. Thus, as the Court had 
stated previously, the agency must make "reasonable accommoda-
tion of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's 
care by the statute."111 The Court in Chevron noted that the 
Clean Air Act was "a lengthy, detailed, technical, complex, and 
comprehensive response to a major social issue,"112 and that Con-
gress left to the agency the job of resolving the policies involved.113 
Courts, it found, are not the proper institutions for resolving these 
issues because "[j]udges are not experts in the field, and are not 
part of either political branch of the Government."114 Thus, the 
Court found that reviewing courts should not be involved in poli-
cymaking discretion beyond ensuring that policymaking discretion 
existed under the statute and the agency took care in its 
decisions. us 
D. Some Conclusions About the Review Standard for 
Discretion 
The review standard applied to the three reviewable types of 
discretion is almost invariably arbitrariness or abuse of discretion. 
Sometimes one or the other of these word formulas seems more 
appropriate, but they are similar in meaning. In short, they in-
struct the reviewing court to tolerate a relatively high risk of error 
in discretionary decisions. 
However, the actual level of review differs according to the type 
of discretion, even though the word formula for the applicable 
standard is the same. Thus, we can find more precision in these 
standards by analyzing how they should be applied to the three 
reviewable forms of discretion - individualizing, executing, and 
policymaking. 
Individualizing discretion allows the implementing official to 
make adjustments in the applicable rule, whether statutory, ad-
ministrative, or judicial. The power may be expressed or implied, 
but even if it is not, it is probably inherent in most administrative 
schemes. Its purpose is to add flexibility to the administrative pro-
110. Id. at 843. 
111. United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961). 
112. 467 U.S. at 848. 
113. See id. at 862. 
114. Id. at 865. 
115. See id. at 865-66. 
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cess; it is not a function of expertise. For this reason, reviewing 
courts have the capacity to review these judgments in some depth. 
The great mass of these decisions, however, demands that courts 
refrain from doing so. 
How does this all relate the application of the arbitrariness or 
abuse of discretion standards to individualizing discretion? The 
basic notion of these standards is that the reviewing court should 
tolerate a relatively high risk of error and curb its most critical 
attitudes. In a category of decisions in which they share almost 
equal capacity with the agency, however, these standards may sug-
gest a fairly searching inquiry; although the search is for risk of 
error, not error itself, i.e., disagreement. 
The proper judicial approach to individualizing discretion sug-
gests the following inquiries: the court should determine that the 
core discretionary decision is a permissible deviation from the gen-
eral rule and that it is a plausible adjustment in that rule; and the 
court should ensure that the decision is the result of sound intel-
lectual consideration (that the official took a hard look). 
Mter these inquiries, however, the court may choose to delve 
more deeply into the core discretionary decision. Practical consid-
erations demand that it carefully select the cases in which it does 
so. Because the court has nearly equal capacity with the agency, 
its inquiry can be substantial so long as it has a sound basis for 
going this far, e.g., the presence of a pattern of similar question-
able agency decisions. 
The arbitrariness and abuse of discretion standards also permit 
a searching judicial inquiry into the exercise of executing discre-
tion. Yet the considerations are quite different. The courts have a 
substantial function here because the decisions are in the nature 
of questions of law. The decisions are not implementing adjust-
ments of an applicable rule, as is the exercise of individualizing 
discretion, but an extension of some rule. These are the kind of 
questions courts are particularly capable of addressing. On the 
other hand, unlike the exercise of individualizing discretion, the 
exercise of executing discretion may involve special agency 
expertise. 
The key then to determining the judicial role with respect to 
executing discretion is institutional competence. When the 
agency has superior capacity, then the court should give the 
agency considerable freedom in exercising executing discretion. 
When the agency capacity is not superior, the court may engage in 
a more searching inquiry. This inquiry should still focus on poten-
tial error, not agreement, and tolerate a fairly high risk of error. 
The arbitrariness and abuse of discretion standards demand a 
great deal of judicial restraint when applied to policymaking dis-
cretion. Policymaking discretion differs fundamentally from exe-
cuting discretion. The latter involves an extension along a path 
defined by the legislation; the former involves defining the path 
itself. For whatever reason, the agency has been assigned this 
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function and the reviewing court will arrogate power if it inquires 
too deeply into its exercise.116 Although the arbitrariness and 
abuse of discretion standards leave courts with an active, if very 
different, monitoring role with respect to individualizing and exe-
cuting discretion, these standards substantially restrict review 
when applied to policymaking discretion.117 
Here, review is dominated by the hard look doctrine. The court 
should ensure that the agency took a hard look at the policy issue. 
However, once it has concluded that the agency did, the court's 
function comes to an abrupt end. It is not to inquire further into 
the core discretionary decision. 
Of course, review of all three types of discretion is not limited to 
the core decision; it must control for mistakes of law, procedural 
inadequacies, improper external pressures and influences, and 
constitutional abuses.l18 The review function as to the other ele-
ments of the agency action may be covered by a different standard. 
The threshold question for the court is always whether the 
agency correctly applied the law. Courts are the final arbiters of 
questions of law, and hence their review of this threshold question 
demands that they agree with the legal conclusions of the agency. 
They can substitute their judgment for a legal conclusion with 
which they disagree. However, they must not expand their review 
of discretionary decisions by turning them into a question of law. 
They must meticulously avoid expanding their function through 
their power to decide questions of law. 
One crucial question of law is the scope of the discretion as-
signed to the agency, and the first step in reaching the discretion-
ary decision itself is to determine whether the agency acted within 
its discretion. If courts apply the categories suggested above, their 
next step is to find what kind of discretion they are reviewing. As 
suggested, the extent of their review of the core discretionary de-
cision will be governed by this determination. 
Courts also have plenary power in reviewing procedures.119 
Some care should be taken here also because review of procedures 
is an easy way to take over substantive issues. A court is tempted 
to impose more formal procedures as a subterfuge to get at the 
substantive decision. Moreover, while more procedures will cer-
tainly improve the exercise of discretion in some instances, mere 
116. See Levin, supra note 65, at 12. 
117. E.g., ABA Report, supra note 13, at 255 (recommending that "[a] court shall set 
aside agency action if it finds that ... the [agency's] action rests upon policy judgment 
that is so unacceptable as to render the action arbitrary"). 
118. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B)-(D) (1982). 
119. 2 C. KocH, supra note 1, § 9.19, at 135-41. 
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resort to formalizing procedures can do substantial harm.120 
It is essential that reviewing courts not impose more procedures 
on a program requiring the exercise of discretion merely because 
it cannot think of anything better to do. Additional procedures 
can as easily harm these programs as help them.121 In lieu of 
doubtful procedural remedies for defective exercises of these 
three types of discretion, the court should usually confine itself to 
remedies aimed at any substantive defect. Often constructing a 
remedy is difficult, and courts are left with returning the decision 
to the agency and instructing it to try again. 
One useful alternative remedy for a defective exercise of discre-
tion may be required rulemaking.122 It has long been held that a 
court cannot interfere in an agency's choice of procedures,12a but, 
as a remedy, the court would be instructing the agency to correct 
its own inadequate exercise of discretion.124 Such an order would 
infringe to a lesser degree on the administrative authority than an 
order compelling t~e agency to reach different conclusions in such 
cases. . 
In addition to review of the exercise of discretion, law, and pro-
cedure, the court must, of course, examine the external environ-
ment surrounding the exercise of discretion. Courts must review 
the external characteristics of the particular discretionary deci-
sionmaking to assure that the decision is not skewed by improper 
forces outside the process. Because of the different nature of the 
three forms of discretion, the permissible external considerations 
may differ, and hence this review also tends to differ among the 
three types of discretion. 
II. Review of the Two "Unreviewable" Types of Discretion 
The first three uses of the term discretion are reviewable, albeit 
under limited standards of review. However, there are types of 
discretion that are considered "unreviewable." I have divided 
such discretion into two categories: unbridled discretion and nu-
minous discretion. A reviewing court cannot review the core dis-
cretionary decision made in the exercise of either of these types of 
120. See Friendly, supra note 8, at 1280. Evidence that more procedures add accu-
racy is nonexistent, see SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS, supra note 12, at 
xx-xxi (stating that "there is no accepted external standard for evaluating accuracy''), 
and the other benefits of many procedural elements are at best debatable. Review of 
procedures for exercising individualizing discretion is important and a court should 
not be reticent to undertake such review; nevertheless, a court should not impose 
additional procedures on a program using individualizing discretion merely because it 
cannot think of anything better to do. The reviewing court must understand the bene-
fits of individualizing discretion and not diminish those benefits by cavalier proce-
dural demands. 
121. This is the one way to express the teaching of the due process cases. See 
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 310, 348-49 (1976). 
122. K. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 57-58. 
123. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947); see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace 
Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-94 (1974). 
124. 2 C. KOCH, supra note 1, § 2.15, at 77. 
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discretion. However, the agency's authority to exercise the discre-
tion and the environment in which it is exercised are reviewable. 
A reviewing court's function with respect to these reviewable as-
pects of unreviewable discretion differs as between the two uses of 
the term. More importantly, the foundation for unreviewability 
of these two types of discretion differs fundamentally, and this dif-
ference may substantially affect the support for the un-
reviewability of each. 
A. Unbridled Discretion 
The average person seems to use the term discretion to mean 
decisionmaking authority that cannot be reversed by a higher au-
thority. Indeed, Webster's defines discretion as "individual choice 
or judgment."125 This use of discretion may apply to decisions at 
every level of importance. A baseball umpire has such discretion, 
as does a parent in most instances, a general in the field of battle, 
and a pilot about to unload a bomb. To some extent, every person 
has this form of discretion on many occasions. We may call this 
type of unreviewable discretion "unbridled discretion." 
Unbridled discretion is created by two methods in the adminis-
trative scheme: through inadvertence or through legal doctrine. 
Inadvertent unbridled discretion results because no higher au-
thority is provided by the process and each administrative process 
inevitably includes a good deal of such unbridled discretion.126 
Here we focus on the second-unbridled discretion created by legal 
doctrine. 
Such unbridled discretion can result from either common law 
evolution or implied or express legislative preclusion. The most 
obvious examples involve express statutory prohibitions against 
judicial review; but, over time, several areas of government action, 
such as military or prosecutorial decisions, have been withdrawn 
from judicial review. 
Choices based on characteristics peculiar to the administrative 
scheme might justify such unbridled discretion. Generally, it ex-
125. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 324 (8th ed. 1979). 
126. See P. SCHUCK, SUING THE GoVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL 
WRONG 66 (1983). Usually these decisions are so trivial that control is not contem-
plated. However, even these decisions may be important. The decision to have a 
memorandum retyped is unreviewable, but that decision may affect the rights of a 
large number of people, including the typist, those awaiting the memorandum, and 
those awaiting the decision based on the memorandum. When these decisions pro-
duce particularly egregious results, they may be removed from the unbridled discre-
tion of the official either as a class or individually. Generally, however, the authority 
merely exists \vithout analysis or serious question. It is unnecessary to relate this 
type of unbridled discretion to the judicial review system even though it includes a 
massive, and in the aggregate, important body of administrative discretion. 
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ists due to a perceived need to end the process or due to a decision 
about the efficient allocation of decisionmaking resources. How-
ever, administrative decisions assigned to agencies' unbridled dis-
cretion can be reviewed in the sense that courts have the capacity 
to evaluate the type of decision; but courts are for some reason 
forbidden from reviewing them. That is, the discretion in this sec-
tion covers the situations in which the court is not permitted to 
review but they have the ability to do so; in contrast to numinous 
discretion, discussed in the next section, which covers discretion-
ary decisions courts are not able to review. It is further suggested 
that this distinction could soften the doctrine of unreviewability as 
to unbridled discretion. 
Unbridled discretion is complete. For reasons that have little to 
do with the potential value of court involvement, the court has no 
authority over the core decision. The only question is the thresh-
old question: Is this an issue that was assigned to the unreview-
able authority of the agency? If the answer is yes, the court's 
function ends. It has no function as to that part of the decision; 
not even a limited function as defined by one of the limiting stan-
dards of review. (The court is left like Bob Uecker in the cheap 
seats, impotently yelling its criticism with the rest of us.) 
However, some functions remain for the courts. The existence 
of unbridled discretion is a question of law over which courts have 
ultimate authority; hence courts play a significant authority-
defining role in administrative schemes in which unbridled discre-
tion might exist.127 They may also check for procedural inadequa-
cies, or mistakes as to the criteria under which an individual 
decision is made. Of course, even if the decision is covered by un-
bridled discretion- and therefore completely removed from judi-
cial scrutiny - courts will review the constitutionality of the 
underlying statute.128 If the decision is only partially covered by 
unbridled discretion, the court must review the remaining ques-
tions. 
Because the existence or scope of unbridled discretion defines 
the review function, the major issue on review is whether unbri-
dled discretion covers a particular administrative decision or por-
tion of a decision.129 This question can be broken down into those 
situations where the legislature has made the decision unreview-
able and those situations where the agency has been given the ulti-
mate authority by evolved legal doctrine. The power of courts to 
limit the unreviewability of unbridled discretion may depend on 
its source. 
127. Nonetheless, the decision here is polar. If the discretion exists, the court can-
not review the core decision; if the discretion does not cover the decision, the court's 
review is controlled by some other doctrine. If the court finds the decision outside the 
unbridled discretion, the standard of review becomes a new and open question. 
128. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974). 
129. Within a particular decision, only certain issues are commonly unreviewable; 
other parts of the decision may still be reviewed. The discretion is "unbridled" only as 
to the unreviewable issues. 
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Express grants of unbridled discretion result from the ex-
pressed design of the legislative delegation. Some federal statutes 
make certain agency decisions unreviewable. lao The AP A pro-
vides for this type of unreviewability in section 701(a)(1).131 
The extent to which the preclusion must be clear on the face of 
the statute is controversial. Some argue that only express lan-
guage can render an administrative decision unreviewable. Others 
argue that traditional tools of legislative interpretation, such as 
legislative history and rules of statutory construction, should be 
used where the statute is unclear.132 The latter approach is consis-
tent with the ordinary way of reading statutes and the need to 
protect administrative programs from undesired judicial 
interference. 
The first approach, however, expresses the modern aversion to 
unreviewability. If the system requires express preclusion, fewer 
decisions will be removed from judicial supervision. This view 
also recognizes that courts are perfectly capable of reviewing the 
type of decisions that might involve unbridled discretion and that 
those decisions are usually unreviewable only due to such factors 
as judicial or administrative economy. The undisputed role of the 
judiciary in the administrative system probably supports the view 
that unreviewability should be at least clearly intended if not nec-
essarily clearly expressed.133 
Unbridled discretion exists because it exists. A legislature 
should confer unbridled discretion on an agency only upon careful 
reflection. Therefore, interpretation of statutes that might confer 
unbridled discretion should ensure that unreviewability is the leg-
islative intention. This may not limit the court to the four corners 
130. E.g., 38 U.S.C. § 2lla (1982). Section 211 states: 
I d. 
[T]he decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under 
any law administered by the Veterans' Administration providing benefits 
for veterans ... shall be final and conclusive and no other official or any 
court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any 
such decision .... 
131. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1982). 
132. 2 C. KOCH, supra note 1, § 9.32, at 144. 
133. See H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 233, 275 (1946). The Supreme 
Court has both closely restricted the search for statutory preclusion and permitted 
broader searches of the usual aids to statutory construction. Thus, on one hand, Jus-
tice Sandra Day O'Connor, in Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984), 
stated: 
Whether and to what extent a particular statute precludes judicial re-
view is determined not only from its express language, but also from the 
structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and 
the nature of the administrative action involved. 
Id. at 345. On the other hand, the Supreme Court, in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 
387 U.S. 136 (1967), required express language to support unreviewabililty. I d. at 141. 
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of the statute, but it comes close to doing so.1a4 
Not all unbridled discretion, however, is created by statute; 
some unbridled discretion has evolved over time. As in the case of 
statutorily created unbridled discretion, these sources must be 
carefully scrutinized. 
It is often thought that this unreviewability is expressed in the 
AP A by section 701(a)(2).135 The term ''by law" might be said to 
instrucf a court to infer unreviewability where some law, other 
than specific statutory language referred to in section 701(a)(l), 
prohibits review.136 If section 701(a)(2) is so interpreted, either 
subsection (a)(l) or (a)(2), if applied to a particular agency deci-
sion, may create unbridled discretion. That is, because either a 
statute or evolved doctrine precludes review, a court has no func-
tion with respect to the issues covered.137 
Section 701(a)(2) should be very strictly construed to the extent 
it covers the creation of unbridled discretion, and traditional law 
or evolved legal doctrine supporting unreviewability of such dis-
cretion should be closely confined. Section 701(a)(2) has been in-
terpreted as carrying the same presumption against unre-
viewability invoked for statutory preclusion.138 Indeed, because 
part of the law that creates such unreviewability results from judi-
cially evolved doctrine, courts may have the power to cut back on 
such preclusion. 
134. Unbridled discretion should be so extraordinary that it should almost always 
be based on a clear expression of legislative will. Although the law generally allows 
courts to rely on legislative history, it is not unheard of for the law to restrict judicial 
power to go beyond statutory language. In interpreting the language of the Freedom 
of Information Act exemptions, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982), for example, courts have 
been restricted to the words of the statute. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677-78 
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1076-77 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Wellford v. 
Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24-25 (4th Cir. 1971). Techniques of statutory interpretation in-
volving extraneous aids are extremely imprecise, requiring courts to stick to the stat-
ute's language unless that language is unclear. N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION§ 46.01, at 73-74 (4th ed. 1984); James v. United States, 760 F.2d 590, 
593-95 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 379 (1985); Barnes v. Cohen, 749 F.2d 1009, 
1013 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2126 (1985). Because unreviewability cre-
ates unbridled discretion, the law should adopt a doctrine of strict interpretation. 
Except in very rare circumstances, such decisions should be unreviewable only if the 
statute clearly so provides. 
135. 5 U.S.C. § 70l(a)(2) (1982) (providing that "agency action [may be] committed 
to agency discretion by law"). 
136. Id. § 701(a)(l) (providing that "statutes [may] preclude judicial review"). 
137. Decisions involving discretion which by its nature cannot be reviewed create 
another kind of discretion: numinous discretion. Numinous discretion is also unre-
viewable; not because a statute or law makes it unreviewable but because review is 
impossible. This kind of discretion might also be covered by section 701 (a)(2). Legis-
lative history suggests that the APA's drafters meant to include both concepts in the 
subsection. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 212 (1946). Regardless, two kinds 
of unreviewable discretion not created by direct statutory language exist: that which 
cannot be reviewed and that which may not be reviewed. Id. Coverage of the two 
raises entirely different questions and they should not be confused. The second -
unbridled discretion - should not be easily inferred from the law. 
138. But see Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(unreviewability of FHA action); Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1249 (1st Cir. 1970) 
(same). 
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Clearly, courts should not expand those areas for which present 
doctrine precludes review. Courts should infer unbridled discre-
tion only when there is clear law against review.139 In Intercity 
Transportation v. United States, 140 the D.C. Circuit outlined three 
criteria for identifying those cases in which unreviewability might 
be inferred. It interpreted section 701(a)(2) as allowing the infer-
ence of unreviewable or unbridled discretion "where there is little 
need to safeguard petitioner's interests, review would impair the 
effectiveness of agency administration, and the disputed issue is 
not appropriately drawn for judicial review."141 Although there 
may be authority for establishing new unbridled discretion under 
this section, a court should rarely do so. 
Unbridled discretion is traditionally applied to military or for-
eign affairs. The specter of judicial control or management of gov-
ernment action in these areas has created a strongly established 
doctrine against justiciability of any cases involving challenges in 
those areas. A number of cases have confirmed the continued 
strength of that doctrine.142 However, the legal doctrine support-
ing this unbridled discretion might be carefully confined without 
judicial usurpation of authority. 
Care must be taken in these areas because unreviewability here 
has some constitutional basis. It is a fundamental notion that mili-
tary and foreign affairs shall be controlled by the political 
branches. Therefore, it might not be possible for courts to elimi-
nate or even restrict doctrines that provide for unreviewability as 
to these subjects. However, it seems that, while courts should be 
sensitive to the constitutional problem, they might interpret the 
scope of the unreviewability in narrow ways.143 Nonetheless, if 
the "law" referred to in section 701(a)(2) refers to constitutional 
law, courts have little room to maneuver. 
However, the relevant law may not be based on constitutional 
doctrine or statutory preclusion and courts may have substantial 
power to restructure the legal doctrine that prevents review. For 
example, the unreviewability doctrine may not be immutable with 
139. The "no law to apply" doctrine should be used only for numinous discretion, 
which by nature cannot be reviewed. See infra text accompanying notes 189-91. 
140. 737 F.2d 103 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
141. Id. at 107. 
142. See, e.g., Miranda v. Secretary of Treasury, 766 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1985) (up-
holding license denial by the secretary of state acting under the authority of the Trad-
ing With the Enemy Act); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(dismissing a suit challenging the legality of military aid to El Salvador), cert. denied, 
467 U.S. 1251 (1984); Dickson v. Ford, 521 F.2d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) 
(upholding the dismissal of a taxpayer challenge to military and economic assistance 
to Israel), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976). 
143. E.g., Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
59-62 (1984). 
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respect to prosecutorial discretion: a law enforcement agency's 
decision whether or not to bring action. Such discretion is unbri-
dled although it is not by nature beyond the capacity of the 
courts.144 Nor is there any statutory or constitutional law that de-
mands preclusion. Here the court has the power to modify the 
traditional doctrine of unreviewability. 
The failure to carefully consider the basis for unreviewability as 
to such unbridled discretion led to the mistake made in the much-
criticized Supreme Court opinion in Heckler v. Chaney.145 Prison 
inmates brought actions to compel the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) to take enforcement action against the use of lethal 
injections to carry out the death penalty, arguing that the drugs 
used were not approved by the FDA for human executions.146 The 
issue was whether the decision not to act against this drug use was 
committed to agency discretion in a way that precluded review.147 
The district court, the circuit court, and the Supreme Court all 
began with Justice Thurgood Marshall's test for reviewability in 
Overton Park: 14B whether there was "law to apply."149 The D.C. 
Circuit found law to apply but the Supreme Court disagreed. As 
Justice William Rehnquist noted, "[T]his case turns on the impor-
tant question of the extent to which determinations by the FDA 
not to exercise its enforcement authority ... may be judicially re-
viewed."150 The Court started with the presumption that a deci-
sion not to act is unreviewable. This unreviewability, it found, has 
evolved into a well-established doctrine that was not changed by 
the AP A.151 Congress can change such law and is considered to 
have done so when it creates law to apply in the decision not to 
act, but the Court concluded that Congress had not created law to 
apply. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 152 relied 
on by the appellate court in Chaney, found the decision not to act 
reviewable because the legislation "presents an example of statu-
tory language which supplied sufficient standards to rebut the pre-
sumption of unreviewability . . . . The statute being administered 
quite clearly withdrew discretion from the agency and provided 
guidelines for exercise of its enforcement power."153 In Chaney, 
the Court denied that its decision in Bachowski was based on 
144. E.g., Gacy v. Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 1410 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting from de-
nial of certiorari); Edmonds v. Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 271 (1984) (same). 
145. 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985). 
146. Id. at 1652. 
147. Id. at 1654. 
148. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
149. The legislative history of the APA suggests that this is the test. S. REP. No. 
752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 212 (1946) ("If, for example, statutes are drawn in such 
broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply, courts of course have no 
statutory question to review."). 
150. 105 S. Ct. at 1654 (emphasis in original). 
151. Id. at 1656. 
152. 421 u.s. 560 (1975). 
153. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. at 1657. 
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"pragmatic considerations" and asserted that "[t]he danger that 
agencies may not carry out their delegated powers with sufficient 
vigor does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that courts are 
the most appropriate body to police this aspect of their perfor-
mance."154 The decision not to act, the Court concluded, should 
not be considered committed to the unreviewable discretion of the 
agency if Congress "has indicated an intent to circumscribe agency 
enforcement discretion, and has provided meaningful standards 
for defining the limits of that discretion."155 The Court made it 
clear that it was not up to the courts to do so. Thus, it left to Con-
gress the choice to provide review of decisions not to act.156 
However, the unbridled discretion at issue here is not based on 
any immutable doctrine. The Court could pare down pros-
ecutorial discretion not to act because that discretion has been de-
veloped by the courts. Nothing inherent in enforcement decisions 
makes them unreviewable. Courts have the capacity for review-
ing such decisions. Although some evolved concepts of unbridled 
discretion, such as foreign or military affairs decisions, may be 
based on constitutional doctrine, this is not true of other types, 
such as prosecutorial discretion. Despite a tradition of un-
reviewability of enforcement decisions, nothing prevents courts 
from limiting or reversing that tradition. Hence, the Supreme 
Court in Chaney had more authority than it found to change the 
common law that creates unbridled discretion not to act. The ar-
gument it presents supports very limited review, perhaps, but not 
unreviewability. 
Unbridled discretion should not be confused with one of the 
three reviewable types of discretion discussed above. It is true 
that in this country prosecutors and police, for example, have 
prosecutorial and enforcement discretion, but there is no other 
reason than tradition that it should be unbridled. Often this dis-
cretion involves the necessary and beneficial discretion to individ-
ualize and can allow the system to do individual justice; 
prosecutors and police should not be inflexible even where the 
law is clear. Yet, as has been discussed, individualizing discretion 
can be reviewed in a limited way to assure that its exercise is con-
sistent with the spirit of the statute. The benefits of broad 
prosecutorial discretion then are available without conferring un-
bridled discretion on the officials who exercise it. Unbridled dis-
cretion constitutes absolute authority not directly related to doing 
justice. Only tradition supports this unbridled discretion and legal 
doctrine could change this discretion into, say, individualizing dis-
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Of course, constitutional questions would always be reviewable. Id. at 1659. 
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cretion. The law could develop as to this, and other types of tradi-
tional unbridled discretion, towards limited reviewability. Courts 
are freer to evolve such legal doctrine than they believe. 
At the least, the existence of unbridled discretion should be 
clearly mandated. A court must obey the law, but it should also 
interpret sources of unbridled discretion very narrowly. Confus-
ing it with the other uses of the term discretion can and has cre-
ated bad theory of discretion and bad law about discretion. Those 
who insist on strict construction under the statutory preclusion 
provision of the AP A are correct. Cases that construe common 
law concerning unbridled administrative discretion narrowly are 
equally correct. In short, there is very little good about unbridled 
discretion - it is at best a necessary evil brought about by such 
expediencies as the need to end the process or save resources for 
more important decisions. Therefore, the law should incorporate 
a very strong preference against its proliferation, and, indeed, 
should move away from inferring such discretion where it is not 
clearly established by statute or the Constitution. 
B. Numinous Discretion 
There is a use of the term discretion that is hard to define and 
even harder to justify. Nevertheless, it does exist and it seems 
necessary to the administrative system. This use of discretion cov-
ers those situations in which the agency must answer indefinite 
questions in the context of extreme uncertainty. A reviewing 
court cannot demand that a decision based on this kind of discre-
tion be correct or even within a certain tolerance of potential cor-
rectness. This kind of discretion cannot be held to some 
expressed, implied, or derived standard. For this reason, I call the 
exercise of such decisionmaking authority "numinous discretion." 
In reviewing individualizing, executing, and policymaking dis-
cretion, a court can review according to the proper standard, 
which tells the court how much risk of error it must tolerate. De-
cisions reached in the exercise of unbridled discretion could be 
tested under one of these standards, but that review is not permit-
ted.157 Numinous discretion is unique because it cannot be tested 
for error or probability of error. Jurisprudential literature might 
identify this form of discretion as the "strong sense" of the 
term.158 Professor Louis Jaffe has observed this use of the term 
157. If permitted to do so, a court could test these decisions for the risk of error 
prescribed by the standard. 2 C. KOCH, supra note 1, § 9.2, at 85. 
158. Dworkin has explained the meaning of this strong sense of the term: 
502 
Sometimes we use "discretion" in a weak sense, simply to say that for 
some reason the standards an official must apply cannot be applied 
mechanically but demand the use of judgment .... We use "discretion" 
sometimes not merely to say that an official must use judgment in apply-
ing the standards set [for] him by authority, or that no one will review that 
exercise of judgment, but to say that on some issue he is simply not bound 
by standards set by the authority in question. . . . An official's discretion 
means not that he is free to decide without recourse to standards of sense 
and fairness, but only that his decision is not controlled by a standard fur-
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discretion in the administrative process.159 He recognized that re-
view of discretion involves a variety of different functions based 
on the fundamental existence of "a purported application of the 
statutory grants of power to the facts as found."160 He separated 
these grants according to the three types of "rules" they might 
create.161 Two of these three types involve decisionmaking where 
the application of facts is conclusive. In contrast, the third type of 
decisionmaking is entirely different in character - the authoriza-
tion merely suggests what type of facts are relevant but does not 
make them conclusive. When the grant is of this nature, the 
agency must exercise numinous discretion. For such discretionary 
decisionmaking, any standard that might be found or derived from 
the grant only guides the decision; it cannot control the exercise of 
this form of discretion because this type of decisionmaking in-
volves more than the mere application of standards. When this 
type of decision is asked of the agency process, the agency must 
exercise "true discretion" or discretion in the strong sense -
numinous discretion. 
It is difficult to accept numinous discretion; we expect a scien-
tific search for the right answer from all decisionmakers. Never-
theless, some, perhaps many, decisions must be made about 
questions with vague contours in an atmosphere of extreme un-
certainty. Agencies are often forced to make such decisions and 
courts must review those decisions differently from any other 
form of administrative decisionmaking. As Professor Ronald 
Dworkin noted, the official "can be criticized, but not for being 
disobedient."162 That is, the exercise of this form of discretion 
cannot be evaluated against some standard of correctness. 
Although it may be difficult to accept the concept of such deci-
sionmaking, it surfaces in many aspects of our lives. For example, 
I once met a doctoral candidate who claimed his dissertation 
would demonstrate that Huckleberry Finn is homosexual.163 I as-
sert that nowhere in the novels is Huck described as gay - hence 
nished by the particular authority we have in mind when we raise the 
question of discretion. Of course this latter sort of freedom is important; 
that is why we have the strong sense of discretion. Someone who has dis-
cretion in this [strong] sense can be criticized, but not for being 
disobedient .... 
R. DwoRKIN, supra note 2, at 31-33. 
159. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 555-56 (1965). 
160. Id. at 555. 
161. Id. 
162. R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 33. 
163. I am indebted to Professor Dworkin for the concept of this example. See 
Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1978). 
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we must argue from the text as to whether he is gay.164 There is 
no way to prove conclusively that Huck is or is not gay. Huck is 
just a character in a body of literature. He has no life story outside 
Twain's books. In the most literal sense he is not gay or not not 
gay. He may be dirty or foulmouthed or orphaned, but he has no 
sexual proclivities. 
Fortunately, people can make a living arguing about such things 
and writing research materials about them. But no one can prove 
Huck is gay. Now, the panel of scholars that pass on the disserta-
tion will no doubt consider whether the argument is plausible, but 
they will not be able to reach a conclusion as to whether Huck is 
gay. Even if Mark Twain himself were to emerge, like Marshall 
McLuhan in Annie Hall, and proclaim that if he had considered 
the question he would have made Huck gay, there is still no defini-
tive answer to the question. 
Now, assume Congress sets up a Literary Character Sexual Pro-
clivity Commission (LCSPC or, if they put it in the Defense De-
partment, LiChaSeProC). How would this agency decide whether 
Huck is gay? I contend that they could not. But they would be 
required by statute to decide and, under the circumstances, the 
agency would have no choice but to reach a conclusion. This is a 
delegation of numinous discretion. 
Suppose the agency decides that Huck is not gay. How could a 
court review its conclusions? The reviewing court could disagree 
and could even substitute its numinous discretion for that of the 
agency, ruling that Huck will henceforth be gay; but the court can-
not evaluate the agency's decision for error or even probability of 
error. The exercise of this type of decisionmaking simply cannot 
be shared by another authority nor can its results be evaluated 
without appropriating the decisionmaking function. 
In many instances, agencies are given such decisionmaking re-
sponsibilities.165 More to the point, courts are sometimes asked to 
review such decisions. Because numinous discretion can only be 
exercised by one authority, a court that is not careful to recognize 
this kind of discretion may inadvertently usurp authority.166 If 
the court reverses the agency, it is assuming the numinous discre-
tionary authority and not merely monitoring its use.167 
Perhaps the most famous example of numinous discretion is the 
central issue in the FDA's peanut butter rule debacle - whether 
peanut butter should have eighty-seven percent or ninety percent 
peanuts.168 What is the correct percentage of peanuts in peanut 
butter anyway? Surely this controversy dragged on because of the 
164. I have read four books in which Huck appears as a character and find nothing, 
other than reference to pretty girls, to suggest his sexual preferences. 
165. E.g., S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 106-07, 115, 136 (1982). 
166. 2 C. KocH, supra note 1, § 9.34, at 147. 
167. Koch, Confining Judicial Authority Over Administrative Action, 49 Mo. L. 
REV. 183, 214-15 (1984). 
168. Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food and Drug Administration, 50 
TEX. L. REV. 1132, 1144 (1972). 
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nature of the decision more so than any defects in the rulemaking 
procedures. The correct answer simply could not, no matter how 
long it took, be demonstrated. Of course the agency could compile 
materials relating to the issue. In fact, the parties piled 7,736 
pages of junk into the record during nine years,169 but nothing 
could show that eighty-seven percent was more or less correct (or 
even had a greater likelihood of correctness) than ninety percent. 
Ultimately, the FDA officials had to make an educated choice be-
tween the two numbers; whether it took a week or nine years to 
do so. Although some extreme content regulation or percentage 
would have been beyond FDA authority as outside its statutory 
mandate, the range of equally correct answers was very broad. In 
short, the agency had numinous discretion within that range and 
there is no way a reviewing court could have monitored the 
agency's choice without substituting judicial numinous discretion 
for the agency's numinous discretion.170 Numinous discretion is 
involved in a number of administrative decisions.171 
There is a tendency to consider numinous discretion as the sus-
pension of reasoned or considered decisionmaking.172 However, 
when correctly applied it is not only a proper administrative func-
tion - it is one of the strengths of the administrative process. De-
cisions must often be made in the context of extreme uncertainty 
and failure to make an uncertain decision is itself a decision not to 
act. Thus, whether compelled by statute or by circumstance, agen-
cies are often called upon to make decisions that cannot be de-
fended as being correct or even within a tolerance of correctness. 
The essence of such decisionmaking is that knowable factors 
169. Id. 
170. E.g., Corn Prods. Co. v. FDA, 427 F.2d 511 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 
Derby Foods, Inc. v. FDA, 400 U.S. 957 (1970). Courts, like the Third Circuit in re-
viewing the peanut butter rule, often try to review such issues but instinctively avoid 
the dilemma suggested here by assigning the burden of persuasion. Because potential 
correctness cannot be demonstrated, the side with the burden of persuasion simply 
loses. 
171. The purest examples of numinous discretion are trivial: Why is a 30-day filing 
deadline better than a 45-day deadline or 10 copies better than 8? The General As-
sembly of Virginia , for example, recently determined that state employees could be 
reimbursed for no more than $35.00 per day for meals and lodging. 1980 Va. Acts 224 
(amending VA. CODE ANN. § 14.1-5 (1979)). I defy anyone to demonstrate that $35.00 
is more correct and reasonable than $38.49. Many exercises of numinous discretion 
are not trivial, however. Decisions requiring a concrete vision of the future are ready 
examples of important administrative decisions centered around the exercise of numi-
nous discretion. This is true even though some day the correct answer \vill be avail-
able; the future will be now. 
172. "It may be that terms like 'choice,' 'discretion,' and 'judicial legislation' fail to 
do justice to the phenomenology of considered decision: its felt involuntary or even 
inevitable character which often marks the termination of deliberation on conflicting 
considerations." Hart, Problems of Philosophy of Law, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILoS-
OPHY 264, 271 (P. Edwards ed. 1972). 
pass through an unknowable process toward a decision. Jaffe ex-
plains that this type of discretion compels 
the administrator to resort to a whole complex of additional con-
cepts and attitudes, official and personal, some of which ... he 
may not express, some which he may be unaware of. . . . The 
mind focuses attention for a period of time on a group of author-
itative decisional factors. But ultimately it reaches decision by 
an intuitive leap.173 
The process to decision can be analogized to an intuitive mental 
process. Intuition is knowing without conscious reasoning; it is 
the ability of the subconscious mind to synthesize variables in a 
more complex way than can the conscious mind.174 For instance, 
one can recognize the color blue but be hard-pressed to define the 
color in words. It would be even more difficult to be asked to de-
fine the color and then select it from among other colors according 
to the definition. Selecting the color from among other colors 
would not only be simpler but more accurate if the senses - the 
intuitive process - were permitted to act. 
The equivalent of intuitive thinking in a bureaucracy is combin-
ing various talents and strengths in a group decisionmaking pro-
cess. This blending of decisionmaking elements creates what 
might be called "decisional synergism."175 Blending the experi-
ence and knowledge of a number of individuals develops a better 
decision than does the sum of each individual's experience and 
expertise.176 
One of the advantages of the administrative process is that it can 
create diverse groups of decisionmakers and bring them to bear in 
a variety of combinations, producing a synergistic effect. Just as 
an individual thinking intuitively synthesizes an immeasurable ar-
ray of data, an administrative process can bring together a variety 
of instincts, values, sensitivities, experience, and knowledge. The 
advantage of the agency decisionmaking is not limited to the spe-
cial procedures designed for specific types of questions; it includes 
the specially-designed blending of contributors to the decision. 
The essence of review of these decisions cannot be understood 
without recognizing that the advantage of some administrative 
decisionmaking lies in the interaction of these decisionmaking ele-
ments. Often this interaction can be rationalized and structured, 
but sometimes it must be given free rein, just as intuition must be 
free. A court that fails to distinguish the exercise of numinous 
discretion from other forms of agency decisionmaking robs the ad-
ministrative process of its richness and eliminates one of its great-
173. L. JAFFE, supra note 159, at 555-56; see also Hart, supra note 172, at 264, 270 
("The presence or absence of logic in the appraisal of decisions may be a reality 
whether the decisions are reached by calculation or by an intuitive leap."). 
174. SeeP. ANGELES, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 137 (1981) (defining intuition as 
"[t]he power (ability) to have immediate, direct knowledge of something without the 
use of reason"). 
175. Koch, supra note 167, at 213. 
176. See id. 
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est strengths.177 A court that tries to interfere in numinous 
discretion not only usurps authority but diminishes the decision-
making in a way for which it cannot compensate. In no other type 
of discretion must the court exercise more care. 
Freedom is the crucial element in this type of decisionmaking, 
even more so here than with the other types of discretion. Uncer-
tainty is so great that there is no way to evaluate the decision even 
in terms of probability of correctness.178 As with Huck Finn's sex-
ual proclivity, the answer is neither right nor wrong. Yet the 
agency must make some "rough judgment" or no decision is possi-
ble.179 The absence of any sense of correctness forces us to rely 
upon the interaction of decisionmaking elements rather than upon 
the qualities of the decision itself. For this reason, the mental pro-
cess involved in numinous discretion cannot be shared with or 
evaluated by the court.180 
Nevertheless, courts do have some function with respect to the 
exercise of such discretion. First, as always, the court has ultimate 
authority over the question of law: Does the agency have numi-
nous authority? If the agency does, the court must focus its atten-
tion on the environment surrounding the decisionmaking process 
and on the external elements bearing on that decision. Initially 
the court must ensure that the decisionmaking process is fair and 
just. As Dworkin stated, "An official's discretion means not that 
he is free to decide without recourse to standards of sense and fair-
ness, but only that his decision is not controlled by the standard 
furnished by the particular authority .... "181 
Next the court must determine whether all proper and relevant 
decisional elements have been brought together in a way calcu-
lated to take full advantage of decisional synergism and that all 
relevant factors entered the synergistic decisionmaking process. 
Having gained this assurance, the court must ensure that the ad-
ministrative decision reflects the appropriate use of these ele-
ments. As Jaffe stated, the decisionmaker "may freely use all 
permissible elements, though an excessive emphasis on one to the 
exclusion of other elements may be an 'abuse of discretion.' "182 
177. SeeS. BREYER, supra note 165, at 117. 
178. Thus, we rely upon the "more informed uncertainty" of the expert agency. Id. 
at 141; see Frug, supra note 47, at 1318 ("Bureaucracy, in [the expertise] model, is not 
an impersonal machine but a social system, a way of mobilizing all aspects of human 
personality in order to transform individuals into a functioning group."). 
179. S. BREYER, supra note 165, at 148. 
180. It is well-established that courts cannot properly delve into this mental pro-
cess. E.g., Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938) (stating that "[it is] not the 
function of the court to probe the mental processes [of the agency head]''). 
181. R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 33. 
182. L. JAFFE, supra note 159, at 556. 
Therefore, review tends to focus on the agency's explanation for 
its discretionary choice. Such a discretionary decision cannot be 
supported in the same way a judgment can, but it can be justified, 
giving consideration to relevant factors as well as explaining the 
elements of experience and expertise that entered into the deci-
sionmaking. Requiring reasoned decisionmaking does not inject 
the court into the exercise of discretion as long as the court looks 
only at the soundness of the discretionary decisionmaking process. 
In addition to ensuring that the decisional process functions 
properly and that all relevant factors entered the discretionary 
decisionmaking process, the court must consider external pres-
sures that might have affected the operation of that process. Nu-
minous discretion is not exercised in a vacuum, and the court must 
ensure that an agency is not improperly influenced. The court 
must distinguish unacceptable pressures from beneficial ones. 
Therefore, the reviewing court must take care to sort out those 
pressures that properly channel discretion from those that im-
properly skew the decision. A reviewing court might, for exam-
ple, overturn discretionary action because the discretionary 
decision is the result of bias or influence. Although the mere 
existence of such elements is not enough to conclude that the ex-
ercise of discretion is tainted, it might justify a finding of abuse of 
discretion when there is substantial potential that impermissible 
pressures disrupted the internal workings of the decisionmaking 
process. The subtlety necessary for this analysis is shown by the 
fact that only a very limited variety of bias has been found inap-
propriate for administrative decisionmaking.183 On the other 
hand, a likelihood that some prohibited form of bias or influence 
has distorted the discretionary process would justify a finding of 
abuse.184 
Nonetheless, the core discretionary decision that is the result of 
numinous discretion cannot be reviewed. The APA provides for 
the inherent unreviewability of numinous discretion. Section 
701(a)(2) precludes review of discretionary decisions that are 
"committed to agency discretion by law."1B5 The introductory 
phrase in section 701 - "to the extent that" - should be read 
with this provision. The section can then be interpreted as pre-
cluding review when the assignment of discretion is so complete 
that judicial scrutiny would be improper and the decision is so 
committed to agency discretion as to foreclose the possibility of a 
role for the courts.186 In short, this subsection of the APA can be 
183. Koch, Prejudgment: An Unavailable Challenge to Official Administrative 
Action, 33 FED. B.J. 218 (1974). 
184. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 829 (1977); District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 
1245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972); Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 
F.2d 952, 963-65 (5th Cir. 1966); Texas Medical Ass'n v. Mathews, 408 F. Supp. 303, 
306-07 (W.D. Tex. 1976). 
185. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982). 
186. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr 212 (1946) ("If, for example, statutes 
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said to preclude review of numinous discretion. 
The best judicial effort to deal with numinous discretion is the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. 
Volpe. 187 In trying to make sense out of section 701(a)(2), the 
Court developed a useful perspective on the special type of agency 
decision that it calls "wide discretion"188 - numinous discretion 
here. In interpreting this section, the Court provided a standard 
for determining whether a decision is so committed to agency dis-
cretion as to make it beyond judicial scrutiny by its very nature. 
Discretion of this strength, as opposed to that covered by the 
abuse standard of section 706, is numinous discretion. Therefore, 
this case is particularly instructive in identifying such discretion 
even though it focused on the interpretation of section 701. 
Arguing against judicial authority over the Secretary of Trans-
portation's decision to approve a highway through a public park, 
the government in Overton Park contended that such decisions 
were so committed to the secretary's discretion as to preclude re-
view. The Court found that an agency decision could be beyond 
review only when there was "no law to apply."189 The Court 
meant by "no law to apply" that there are no standards by which 
to evaluate the decision. If there are no standards to apply, a court 
cannot review a decision without usurping the discretionary func-
tion assigned to the agency.190 The decision is to be the result of 
the agency's intuitive or numinous discretionary process, not a 
court's.191 
Therefore, the scope of unreviewability of discretionary deci-
sionmaking, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Overton 
Park, fits the conclusion already reached about the nature of nu-
minous discretion. When there are standards by which the deci-
sion can be evaluated, whether expressed by or derived from the 
law, courts can exercise proper review by using these standards. If 
no standards exist, or the standards are intended only to guide the 
agency decision, the decision involves numinous discretion. As the 
Supreme Court stated, there is "no law to apply" when no stan-
dards exist or when the standards are not mandatory. Although 
these decisions can be monitored by courts searching for the ex-
are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply, courts of 
course have no statutory question to review."). 
187. 401 u.s. 402 (1971). 
188. Id. at 411. 
189. Id. at 410. 
190. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr 275 (1946) ("Matters of discretion 
are necessarily exempted from the section, since otherwise courts would in effect su-
persede agency functioning."). 
191. E.g., UAW v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. 
Ct. 81 (1985). 
ternal defects discussed above, the core of the decision cannot be 
judged for error or risk of error. 
One example of the application of this concept of unreviewable 
discretion is Greenwood Utilities Commission v. Hodel.192 A mu-
nicipal power agency questioned the allocation of power to it by 
the Department of Energy. In the Flood Control Act, Congress 
gave the Department authority to distribute excess power gener-
ated at flood control dams.193 The Eleventh Circuit found that 
this decision was committed to the Department's unreviewable 
discretion under section 701(a)(2) because there was "no law to 
apply."194 It found that the Act merely established "a series of 
general directives" and did not create a standard by which a court 
could review the agency's distribution decision.1ss 
The court relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in Heckler v. 
Chaney.196 Although the Supreme Court reaffirmed the signifi-
cance of numinous discretion in Chaney, the Chaney court in the 
case before it may have mistaken numinous discretion for the 
other form of unreviewable discretion covered by subsection 
701(a)(2): unbridled discretion created by legal doctrine. The 
agency decision in Chaney may have been unreviewable, but not 
because it was an inherently discretionary decision. Decisions not 
to enforce are not precluded from review by their nature; they are 
precluded from review by the common law of review of agency 
action.197 As noted earlier, this type of unreviewable discretion 
differs markedly from numinous discretion.19S For this reason, 
the Chaney Court may have been less constrained to rework the 
law of unreviewable discretion than it believed. Although appar-
ently under the impression that it was facing the same type of dis-
cretion that was at issue in Overton Park - numinous discretion 
-it probably was not.1ss 
The "wide discretion" at issue in Overton Park is by nature un-
reviewable and cannot be made reviewable. In this way it differs 
from all other uses of the term discretion and has properties that 
limit how it can be conferred or confined. The only alternative for 
Congress is to assign such discretion to another body. The only 
192. 764 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir. 1985). 
193. Flood Control Act of 1944, § 5, 16 U.S.C. § 8255 (1982). 
194. Greenwood, 764 F.2d at 1465; accord Florida v. Department of Interior, 768 
F.2d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1186 (1986). 
195. Greenwood, 764 F.2d at 1464. 
196. 470 u.s. 821 (1985). 
197. Davis asserts that the "no law to apply" test neither follows the APA's legisla-
tive history nor reflects the reality of judicial behavior. K. Davis, Statement before 
the 46th Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit (May 21, 
1985) (available from the clerk of the D.C. Circuit). Perhaps the idea of numinous 
discretion meets his dissatisfaction with the expression of that test. His examples of 
judicial review where there is no law to apply involve cases where the court could 
evaluate the decision without necessarily substituting their discretion for the agency's 
discretion. These cases did not involve numinous discretion, because the issue was not 
by nature incapable of being reviewed. What Davis is objecting to, put in my terms, is 
the inappropriate inference of unbridled discretion. 
198. See supra text accompanying note 144. 
199. See supra text accompanying notes 145-56. 
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alternative for a court is to take the discretion away from the 
agency and either exercise it itself or determine that the discre-
tion has been assigned to another institution. Numinous discre-
tion cannot be shared or subdivided between the agency and the 
court. Once the court determines that an agency has such discre-
tion, it must leave the core decision alone. 
1986] 511 
